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knowledge of the location of the object is irrelevant and not attended
to (and the same analysis applies to anticipatory looking studies,
such as that of Krupenye, Kano, Call, Hirata, & Tomasello, 2016).
I thus agree that an understanding that others know things is
both phylogenetically and ontogenetically primary, but only if we
are talking about knowledge-by-acquaintance involving simple
representations. Understanding representations as propositional
entails, in addition, an understanding that they either match or
mismatch with the objective situation as represented by the one
making the judgment. Propositional knowledge and beliefs thus
involve a comparison and/or coordination of different representa-
tions of one and the same situation, which presupposes both a
prior understanding of something more primitive like
knowledge-by-acquaintance (based on simple perception and rep-
resentation) and, in addition, an ability to compare and/or coor-
dinate potentially different representations (at an executive level).
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Phillips et al. make a compelling case for a reversal in the current
paradigm in “other minds” research by considering the repre-
sentation of other people’s knowledge more basic than the attri-
bution of belief. Unfortunately, they only discuss primates. In
this commentary, I argue that the representation of others’
knowledge is an evolutionary ancient trait, first appearing during
the Cambrian explosion.
In their target article “Knowledge before belief” by Phillips et al., we
are presented with a radical reversal of the current paradigm in
“other minds” research. Breaking with a long tradition that sought
to understand the minds of other humans (and animals) by
focusing on the attribution of beliefs, the authors argue that decades
of empirical research in the cognitive sciences have undermined or
at least begun to call into question the assumption that the attribu-
tion of knowledge rests on a more basic or fundamental capacity to
attribute beliefs. For historical, methodological, and philosophical
reasons, however, other minds research has long been held back
from even considering this option in the conceptual space.
One way to formulate the underlying problem is to ask which
way of representing the minds of others came first – the represen-
tation of knowledge or of beliefs? By first here I mean something
stronger than just during the course of human development, that
is, first in the sense of being evolutionarily more ancient.
Unfortunately, Phillips et al. have little to say about the evolution-
ary history of these traits and, perhaps more worryingly, seem to
conflate evolution and development, discussing both under the
banner of whether the representation of other people’s knowledge
occurs first or later in human infancy. But the order of appearance
of these traits in human development may not be the same as in
evolutionary history. Ontogeny does not have to track phylogeny.
By not paying heed to this fallacy, however, evolutionarily prob-
lematic conclusions straightforwardly follow. If one assumes, for
instance, that representation of beliefs come developmentally
prior in humans, one will only grant representation of others’
knowledge to those animals that are also able to also represent
the others’ beliefs. But, as Phillips et al. themselves recognize,
the latter ability may turn out to be unique to humans. This
would then lead to the phylogenetically untenable conclusion
that humans are the only creatures on this planet able to represent
the mental states of others.
Naturally, there are multiple ways out of this dilemma – and
the most attractive one will certainly be to outright reject the
notion that the ability to represent others’ beliefs comes first.
Phillips et al. accumulate supporting evidence from nonhuman
primate species to make the case that the human ability to repre-
sent beliefs is phylogenetically recent (Marticorena, Ruiz, Mukerji,
Goddu, & Santos, 2011; Martin & Santos, 2014, 2016), but I think
that they could have dived much deeper into our evolutionary
history to support their case.
Approximately 541 million years, in fact, for this is the begin-
ning of the Cambrian explosion when most animal body plans
first appeared (Maloof et al., 2010). The ability to track other’s
knowledge is, I shall argue, an evolutionary ancient trait appear-
ing roughly at the beginning of the Cambrian. What is notable in
the early Cambrian is an increase in body size and the emergence
of various sensory modalities to track one’s environment. But
more sophisticated ways of sensing one’s surrounding naturally
led ways of sensing others – to react. This emergence of a richer
kind of agency gave rise to arms races between predators and prey
(Bengtson, 2002) and the evolution of centralized nervous systems
(Wray, 2015) to coordinate action and perception. It is during this
special period that some philosophers and scientists locate the
origins of subjectivity and subjective experience (Godfrey-Smith,
2017; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019). In research on animal con-
sciousness, there is a temptation to look for human indicators –
signs of conscious experience that are perhaps unique to human
life. But such approaches give rise to views that draw firm bound-
aries between us and other animals (Veit & Huebner, 2020), a
problem that is similarly present in research on the origins of
other minds’ representation. To switch from the rich intentional
belief attribution to the perhaps computationally simpler knowl-
edge attribution may reveal a picture in which the latter is evolu-
tionarily truly ancient. Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance
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programme has long emphasized that the ability to attribute
beliefs should not be conceived as the sudden emergence of a
new sophisticated faculty in human, but one that is similarly pre-
sent in other animals (Dennett, 1987; Veit et al., 2020). Now, we
may have to recognize that it should have been the attribution of
knowledge to others that deserves our attention here.
An important observation made by Godfrey-Smith (2016) is
that there is a transition somewhere in the Cambrian after
which “the mind evolved in response to other minds” (p. 63).
This transition should be understood as the evolution of repre-
senting other minds’ knowledge. An important question for
both predator and prey becomes: Have I been seen? The exis-
tence of eyes appears to function as a shorthand for many ani-
mals to make just this inference – when eyes meet, one infers
knowledge of ones’ location to the subject at the other end of
this exchange. Burrowing, ink release, and flight are useful
attempts to break this link. Many predators avoid the eye con-
tact of their prey at all cost. Knowledge and ignorance of
one’s surroundings can make all the difference to survival.
The evolution of eye-spots on butterflies is one spectacular
invention to make potential predators think that they are
seen, thus avoiding conflict. Behaviourists may appeal to sim-
pler explanations, but in this case, knowledge attribution may
not be such a complex affair. To see others in one’s environment
as subjects is bound to give one an edge over others in an ecol-
ogy of interaction. But to treat others as subjects entails the
attribution of knowledge.
The picture I have offered here is a speculative one – one that
ties the explosion of diversity during the Cambrian to the
recognition of other minds’ knowledge. Nevertheless, it offers
additional support to the main conclusion in Phillips et al.
Focusing on human representations of other minds might have
biased us against a much more basic approach to other minds
research. The attribution of knowledge to other minds may be
an evolutionarily much more ancient trait than the attribution
of belief, an idea that I will follow up elsewhere (Veit 2021).
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Why is knowledge faster than (true)
belief?
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Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attri-
bution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than
belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is
about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advan-
tage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution
advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-
based and minimalist alternatives.
One of the key claims of the target article is that reasoning about
states of knowledge is faster and more automatic than reasoning
about states of belief. Although Phillips and colleagues provide a
range of evidence to support this claim, they do not explain what
it is about knowledge attribution that makes it more efficient than
belief attribution. Filling in these details will be crucial to explain
how knowledge attribution actually works and would also help to
distinguish the proposed framework from nearby alternatives.
One way for the authors to explain the knowledge-attribution
advantage would be to adopt a minimalist approach, and suggest
that knowledge-based mindreading deploys representations of
non-propositional relations that hold between agents and states
of affairs – something analogous to Burge’s notion of sensing
(Burge, 2018) or Butterfill and Apperly’s notion of a registration
(Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). However, as proponents of these
minimalist models have been careful to point out, this kind of
mindreading does not actually enable agents to reason about
propositional attitudes; rather, they enable agents to track mental
states like belief without representing them as such. Because
knowledge is also a propositional attitude, this means that mini-
mal mindreading could not support genuine knowledge attribu-
tion. At most, it would enable an agent to extensionally track
factive states without representing them as knowledge. If the
account described in the target article aims for more than this,
then a minimalist approach will not do.
A better approach to explaining the knowledge-attribution
advantage would be to start by looking at the processing demands
of false-belief attribution, the paradigmatic example of proposi-
tional attitude reasoning. Famously, false-belief attribution requires
mindreaders to generate and maintain two mutually inconsistent,
decoupled representations of the world, which places inherent
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